

# FATE

## Fate Summit 2016

Paris, 28<sup>th</sup>-29<sup>th</sup> April


Fenvac  
SOS Catastrophes  
& Terrorisme




Families Against Terrorism & Extremism



The Association  
of British Muslims  
est. 1889




S.A.V.E. Belgium



SAVE  
SISTERS AGAINST VIOLENT EXTREMISM



QUILLIAM



TerRa

Terrorism and Radicalisation


Prevention, De-radicalisation & Citizenship

Co-funded by the Prevention of and Fight against Crime Programme  
of the European Union



SONS  
DAUGHTERS  
of the World





## About FATE

Families Against Terrorism and Extremism (FATE) is a grassroots network of organisations, families and individuals at the forefront of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) across Europe. FATE looks beyond the immediate security environment and into the future. Violent extremism is not a problem confined to any one continent, religion or people, but a global issue. We can all play a role in preventing future tragedy and it is through a campaign group, network and summit like this, that we can begin this process.

## Families and Countering Violent Extremism

Families are important partners in the global struggle against extremism of all kinds. We can be educators, guides and helpers. We are supporters and protectors, able to intervene if our child takes the wrong path. We are brothers and sisters, trusted confidants, motivators, influencers. We challenge our families, support them through tough times, and can help them find the right path in life. Now is the time to come together to play all of these roles, prevent radicalisation and counter violent extremism. FATE is here to help that happen.

As families, we are on the frontline in the struggle against violent extremism and terrorism. We are the first hit with pain, shame and guilt as our loved ones move towards extremist organisations or are targeted by terrorist attacks. It is time to fight back with resilience. We can make a real difference to prevent tragedies.

FATE unites, empowers and supports families; to enhance effective cooperation between families and authorities; to raise awareness among young people and the public at large about the spread of violent extremism; to educate all to the signs of radicalisation; and to give families the tools they need to keep young people safe.

## FATE and the Future

The formation of FATE has the potential to be a watershed moment in the battle against terrorism and extremism. We are honoured to welcome you to this summit and we hope that this will only be the beginning of what will be a long and sustained network of resilience, courage and expression. Let's use this summit to find out exactly how this can work. We strongly encourage you to tweet, share and talk about your experience of the Summit.

Follow FATE on [Twitter at @FATE\\_2016](#), join the [FATE community on Facebook](#), like us on [Instagram at Fate.2016](#) and visit us at our website <http://www.findFATE.org>





Families Against Terrorism & Extremism

## FATE 2016 Speakers List


### Saliha Ben Ali, Founder of SAVE



Saliha Ben Ali is a veteran social worker and the founder of SAVE (Society Against Violent Extremism) Belgium, a group that works to protect children from extremist recruiters and supports families whose children abandoned them to join radical organisations. She founded the group after her son, Sabri, was killed in Syria in 2013. She leads the Women Without Borders' Mothers School in Belgium and is an active member of the campaign to establish a Mothers School in Europe. She is the mother of four children.

*"My hope is to learn more about the different projects against extremism in the world and share our experiences in this fight."*

### Sheikh Paul Salahuddin Armstrong, Association of British Muslims




Sheikh Paul Salahuddin Armstrong is an imam and murshid (spiritual teacher) based in the UK, currently the Co-Director of the Association of British Muslims, and actively involved in community related activities, including safeguarding and countering extremist narratives, often through approaches rooted in Islamic theology and jurisprudence (fiqh).

Researching religion and spirituality for over 16 years, he's encountered and spent time with many different Muslim groups, and has a good working knowledge of British Muslim communities and challenges in the area of safeguarding.

*"Through the conference I'm looking to build relationships with people and organisations concerned about the spread of extremist narratives and the violent extremism that results from them. Through developing FATE we will develop a network that more effectively counters the narratives and ideology at the root this most worrying issue, than any of us or our organisations can do on our own."*



## **Christianne Boudreau, Coordinator of Mothers for Life**



As a mother personally affected by the impact of violent radicalization processes in her own family, she has stepped forward for other families sharing similar problems. Christianne has been featured in international media on various topics related to prevention and intervention with violent radicalization and is now counselling other families.

She is an active participant in the Extreme Dialogue project for education and prevention as well as coordinator of the mothers network "Mothers for Life" with Daniel Koehler of

GIRDS in Germany, which brings together mothers of radicalized youth to give them a stronger voice globally.

*"In order to effectively deal with the violent extremism issues that our world is facing today, we need to learn how to work together, respecting each other's' roles in bringing solutions together. I would like to see the parents' voices amplified. They are the most effective means of prevention and intervention. As well, governments, academics, and organizations need to recognize what effected families can bring to the table and support them in this solutions rather than use them just to give credibility to the work their doing without taking them seriously. There needs to be much more support and awareness for the affected families."*

## **Dominique Bons, Syrien ne bouge agissons**



The association "Syrien ne bouge agissons" was founded by Dominique in 2014 after the death of her son in Syria in 2013. The organisation's goal is to regroup, accompany, help and listen to families in their explorations and questions surrounding the theme of radicalisation.

The association aims to sensitise and inform youth and parents unaware of the consequences linked to an eventual departure to Syria or Iraq, with the support of National Education, permanent educational networks, and religious professionals specialising in reflection on current religious trends, and to make youth aware of this issue. It seeks to establish a national and international conference in order to unite all affected families.

*"My goal at the summit is to give a testimonial of my experience, discuss and explore the lure of radicalisation and find adequate solutions to obstruct it. For the FATE network, I want to see collaboration, together; across all nations."*



## **Iris Boyer, Counter Speech Programmes at Facebook**



Iris Boyer is responsible for designing, launching and scaling Policy Programmes for Facebook in EMEA and particularly focusing on Counter Speech and Social Good Programmes, in close relations with civil society leaders in these fields.

Iris's background is in political science and diplomacy. She studied political science in France where she specialized in European policies. She later focused on comparative public policies in a British-Russian Master of Public Administration in Moscow where she also spent time working on French-Russian economic relations in a think tank based at the French-Russian Chamber of commerce.

Her other previous experience includes assignments at the European Parliament in Brussels working for an MEP, in an NGO advocating for international volunteering, at French MFA as an editor on Russia and non EU eastern countries and at French Embassy in Baku, Azerbaijan as an economic attache for South Caucasus and Turkmenistan.

## **Karolina Damn, Founder 'Sons and Daughters of the World'**



Karolina Dam is a secretary working for the Copenhagen Municipality. She made headlines in Danish media last year when she went public with the story of her 18 year old son, Lukas, who travelled to Syria in 2014, ending up joining ISIS. Lukas Dam allegedly past away in December 2014 due to an airstrike conducted by the American-led coalition.

Karolina Dam was the first Danish parent of an ISIS member to speak openly about the issue. She is the founder of 'Son and Daughters of the World', a network and consulting forum for parents of radicalized children.

In February 2016, Karolina Dam received recognition from the prestigious 'Finn Nørgaard Organisation'—named after one of the victims of the Copenhagen Shootings in February 2015. She also works with the international network 'Mothers for Life'.

*"With FATE by our side, we can build more momentum behind our efforts to create awareness around radicalisation and meet new moms/dads. This is very important work as we can combine ours campaigns with local authorities, form new training workshops and more effectively fight extremism"*



### **Adam Deen, Head of Outreach at Quilliam**



Adam was previously a senior member of the Islamist extremist organisation, al-Muhajiroun, and utilised universities himself as a key source for recruitment. Adam became disillusioned with his extremist beliefs and began a journey away from Islamist extremism. Adam now dedicates his work to countering extremism and the Islamist ideology he once subscribed to, which he believes tarnishes the beauty of the Islam. Adam's past experiences add tremendous value to our outreach work.

In 2012, Adam founded the Deen Institute, which teaches Muslims critical thinking skills and increases awareness of Islam's rich intellectual heritage. He has spoken at over 40 university campuses across the UK and has debated with prominent academics on issues surrounding religious philosophy and theology.

*"My journey in and out of extremism was a very difficult one. My family was simply underequipped and underprepared to deal with my radicalisation. FATE can make a huge difference and I hope we can use it to reach more families and more vulnerable people and inspire families to take action"*

### **Hannah Daniel, Counter Extremism Project**




Hannah Daniel is an independent Consultant working with the Counter Extremism Project on their UK based projects including extremism and social media, counter narratives and stakeholder engagement. From 2010-2015 Hannah worked in British politics, spending 5 years in Parliament and working with Government and political organisations. Hannah spoke at the European Parliament's Security and Defense Sub-Committee in 2015.

"I am excited to be taking part in FATE and seeing how grassroots communications and counter narratives can combat extremism. Working with families to deliver this is

vital."

### **Michael Evans, Victim of Extremism**




Michael Evans tragically lost his older brother Thomas to extremism in 2012. Thomas converted to Islam, was radicalised and went to fight in Somalia and Kenya with Al-Shebaab, where he was later killed in 2015. Michael and his mother Sally have since been in the glare of the public eye and have recently featured in an award winning documentary on their experience. Michael has given evidence and testimony in parliament and is looking to establish a foundation in the future to help dissuade others from the path of violent extremism.

"It can be hard talking about these issues and trying to live a normal life again too. FATE is a good opportunity to here others and share my story."



## **Stephen Edgeley, Senior Health Care Official**



Stephen Edgeley has extensive experience within healthcare provision spanning 35 years both in clinical and Executive roles specifically in the context of mental health and children's service provision. He achieved national and international acclaim for his work in Liaison Psychiatry and Trauma Management. He is committed to the vulnerable persons' agenda and has a number of roles both in and out of Statutory Health Provision.

He acts as a Mental Health Advisor at a number of national forums in the context of vulnerable persons and the agenda in relation to extremism and radicalisation. As a registered Consultant Nurse Psychotherapist he delivers direct clinical intervention as part of a senior clinical team. This team delivers specific intervention for trauma related illness, complex family intervention and psychological consequences of physical ill

health.

As co-founder of the ORCA Health Group, the organisation's principles are based on the ability to remain committed to being person centred and reflective of the experience illustrated in this biography. He is currently completing a piece of research in identifying key factors within individual cases that enable vulnerable people to be open to exploitation.

*"This is a great opportunity to meet professional colleagues, individuals and families who either work, support, or are victims of abuse as a result of terrorism and extremism. I appreciate this opportunity for further learning and understanding from individuals perspective and to support further work in a proactive approach in addressing the consequences of this abuse."*

## **Caroline Hurst, Childnet**




Caroline has worked for Childnet for over 4 years and is responsible for their new Digital Leaders Programme and running Activity Days in schools for pupils, staff and parents. Prior to working at Childnet Caroline worked for an educational charity that runs social educational sessions in schools and youth centres.

She brings to the team her skills as a drama practitioner and her experience in the Third Sector, both as an employed member of staff and a volunteer. She has worked in education for many years and has taught abroad in both France and Ghana. She speaks fluent French and holds a degree in French from Leeds University.

*"I hope to facilitate dialogue and conversations between delegates. Through the conference I would like to empower young people, parents/carers and teachers by providing them with the right skills set and language to speak about radicalisation and extremism, so that open conversations can continue after the conference."*



## **Bjørn Ihler, ExtremelyTogether**



Bjørn Ihler is an activist, academic, writer, designer and filmmaker working across mediums to counter violent extremism and terrorism and to promote peace and human rights. A key element in his work is an understanding of the influence design, narratives and storytelling has on our societies and culture and how we by transforming narratives can transform our societies to be more peaceful.

Ihler's work is influenced by his experiences as a survivor of the attack on Utøya Island in Norway on 22/7/2011; however activism and work to prevent violence and hatred has always been among his core interests. Ihler is currently part of

Extremely Together, a group of 10 young leaders gathered by the Kofi Annan Foundation and One Young World work globally against violent extremism.

*"At FATE I'd hope to bring the perspective of both a survivor, activist and academic, to bridge the gaps between those affected by violent extremism, such as families, individuals involved in violent extremist movements and their victims, and academics and activists working across sectors to prevent the damaging effects of violent extremism. I also hope to further build my network, meet new people and use my research to help families fight extremist narratives."*

## **Elizabeth Johnston, Director at the European Forum for Urban Security**



As Executive Director of the European Forum for Urban Security (Efus), Elizabeth Johnston is responsible for the strategy and development of Efus, in liaison with the Executive Committee, and is

in charge of staff management. She is also Executive Director of the French Forum for Urban Security since February 2016.

In addition, she is Secretary of the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime, a member of the Advisory Board of the Global Parliament of Mayors and an official associate of the University of Liege (Belgium).

Prior to this, and after beginning her career at a French local authority, Elizabeth Johnston served as Programme Director at the French-American Foundation, and as Violence Prevention Expert at the World Bank, in Washington. She holds degrees in Law from Assas University (France), in Political Science from Yale University (United-States) and in Public Policy from Marne-La-Vallée University (France).



## **Baroness Neville-Jones, Former Senior Minister, Home Office**



The Rt Hon. the Baroness Neville-Jones DCMG was born Lilian Pauline Neville-Jones on 02 November 1939, and is a Conservative Life peer sitting in the House of Lords since 15 October 2007. Currently sitting on the Science and Technology Committee (Lords) (since June 2015), Baroness Neville-Jones does not chair at this time.

She has in the past sat on The Arctic (Oct 2014 to Feb 2015), Draft Enhanced Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill (Joint Committee) (Jul 2012 to Nov 2012), National Security Strategy (Joint Committee) (May 2012 to Mar 2015).

## **Daniel Koehler, Founder of GIRDS**



Daniel Koehler studied religious studies, political sciences and economics at Princeton University and Free University Berlin. Specialized on terrorism, radicalization, and deradicalization, he worked as a de-radicalization and family counselor in multiple programs and is a pioneer in developing family based intervention programs since 2011.

In October 2014 he founded the German Institute on Radicalization and De-radicalization Studies (GIRDS) and was named a fellow of George Washington University's new Program on Extremism at the Center for Cyber and Homeland Security in 2015. In 2016 he was named the first court expert in de-radicalization in the United States for the Federal District Court in Minneapolis. Daniel Koehler has developed and delivered the first comprehensive family counselling training courses in de-radicalization worldwide.

*"bring family support organizations which are working on a high ethical and practical standard together to form an alliance based on professionalism and expertise to raise global awareness of the role of families in CVE"*


## **Véronique Ketelaer, EFUS**



Holding degrees in Political Science and in Criminology, Véronique Ketelaer has a 20-year experience in local crime prevention and security as manager of local prevention services as well as advisor to local elected officials, expert, consultant for various public organisms, and trainer for adult education (police officers and stakeholders in social care). In March 2015, she was appointed on temporary assignment from the City of Brussels, where she was Director of Prevention (Bravvo) and Participation since 2008. She joined Efus' team as Programme Manager.



## Lorin La Fave, Founder of The Breck Foundation



Lorin founded The Breck Foundation to bring about awareness of the dangers young people face online through bullying and grooming. The Foundation is striving to engage young people to stay safer online through education, prevention and empowerment so that they will make the right decisions for themselves.

Lorin speaks at schools, colleges and universities to pupils, parents, staff and governors, as well as at conferences held for police, health professionals, social workers and anyone involved in child protection to ensure we are all educated to prevent and react appropriately to these very real dangers young people are faced with online.

*"We are participating in the work of FATE as we know predators use the grooming tactics of control, manipulation, lies and brainwashing to find a vulnerability in anyone, especially online. We hope to use Breck's story and lessons we have learned to help others be more aware of the signs of grooming and how to safely report these concerns to ensure young people as well as all members of the public are protected."*

## Nikita Malik, Manager of FemPower



Nikita Malik is a Senior Researcher at Quilliam. Her work focuses on women, families, and extremism, child soldiers of the Islamic State, and terrorism in South Asia. She has authored three reports: "The Children of Islamic State", "Caliphettes: Women and the Appeal of the Islamic State", and "South Asian Terrorist Groups and Global Jihad in 2015".

Nikita has presented findings of these reports to EU and UK Parliament and has written for the Wall Street Journal, Newsweek, the Telegraph, and others. She has appeared on Sky, BBC, CNBC, and CNN (where she was interviewed by Amanpour on female jihadists). Nikita speaks at schools as part of Quilliam's extensive outreach.

*"I am thrilled to be contributing to FATE with FemPower and connecting with new networks and initiatives. FemPower seeks to identify, support and champion women across Europe to challenge extremism in their communities. Partnering with such amazing groups at FATE to look at the issues facing women and mothers in particular is very exciting."*



## **Jonathan Russell, FATE Coordinator**



Jonathan Russell is Quilliam's Head of Policy. Jonathan has been involved at Quilliam since 2012, first as an intern with Dr Usama Hasan, then as Fundraiser, and more recently as Political Liaison Officer.

As Head of Policy, Jonathan runs the Policy Department which is responsible for several of Quilliam's programmes, its relations with policymakers, providing evidence-based policy advice, and managing our external communications.

Jonathan's work involves maintaining Quilliam's position as a non-partisan counter-extremism think-tank; campaigning for a cross-party commitment to progressive, effective and human-rights friendly counter-terrorism and counter-extremism approaches; evidence-based policy advice work package for the EU-funded TERRA II; the #NotAnotherBrother counter-narrative campaign; consultancy work for public and private sector partners all around the world; management of FATE (Families Against Terrorism and Extremism); and the coordination of the joint Kofi Annan Foundation-One Young World project to find 10 young advocates to counter-extremism.

*"What is vital about FATE is it takes that crucial local action and then connects it to a wider network and support group. Acting locally but communicating globally should be our mantra!"*

## **Vidhya Ramalingam, Director of Moonshot CVE**



Vidhya Ramalingam is co-Founder and Director of Moonshot CVE, a specialist organisation which develops innovative and emerging methodologies to counter violent extremism. She works with governments and community organisations worldwide to design and test methods of intervention, counter-messaging, and building resilience to extremism.

Vidhya was previously Senior Fellow at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) where she set up a European-wide capacity building programme on prevention of far-right extremism, in partnership with the governments of Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands. She was also previously Senior Fellow on Migration and Communities at the Institute for Public Policy Research. She is a Faculty Associate at the University of Oxford, Fellow of the German Institute on Radicalization and De-radicalization Studies, and sits on the Advisory Board of Tell MAMA (Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks). She holds an MPhil in Migration Studies from the University of Oxford.



## **Haras Rafiq, Managing Director of Quilliam**



Haras Rafiq is Quilliam's Managing Director and an Executive Board Member. He is currently a member of Prime Minister David Cameron's Community Engagement Forum (CEF) Task Force and was formerly a member of the UK Government's task force looking at countering extremism in response to the 2005 terrorist bombings in London, as well as being a peer mentor for IDeA – advising regional government.

In addition to this, he has worked on and delivered a number of projects relating to the analysis of radicalisation, as well as the deradicalisation of extremists, and has presented on a number of academic and political platforms, nationally and internationally. As part of his work, Haras is committed to countering xenophobia and hatred, and has spoken at many conferences and events, including the Global Forum on combating anti-Semitism (December 2009), as well as being a Chair of a working group of the Global Experts' Forum on anti-Semitism in Ottawa in 2010.

Haras is regularly featured in the media as a commentator and has been a cultural ambassador through the UK Government's "Projecting British Islam" initiative. As well as the above, Haras has also served on the North West Board of the Mosaic initiative, which was initiated by HRH Prince Charles, and aimed at mentoring youngsters to become contributing members of society.

*"I've been working in this space for a long time and I know how important the role of families can be in deterring and countering extremism. The formation of a group like FATE is long overdue and I hope to see it flourish and expand as we move forward in the future. Families need an impartial, go to network. FATE fills that gap."*

## **Dr. Edit Schlaffer, Founder of Women without Borders**



Dr. Edit Schlaffer is a social scientist and founder of Women without Borders, an NGO based in Vienna, Austria. She started Women without Borders in 2002 to strengthen women's capabilities through education, collaboration and self-confidence.

In 2008 she launched the Sisters Against Violent Extremism (SAVE) campaign, focusing Women without Borders' efforts to the security arena, organizing women (and men) internationally to participate in a research-based, family-centered counter-radicalization platform.

In recognition of this innovative work, Schlaffer received the Aenne Burda Award for Creative Leadership in 2015 and the Soroptimist International of Europe Peace Prize 2015. She is a regular speaker, presenting to platforms such as TED talks, Washington, Omega Institute, Rhinebeck, Women in the World, New York and Davos. *"We are beginning a number of campaigns and are interested in learning best practices related to effective social media dissemination and outreach from partners also working on the ground. FATE is a fantastic opportunity for this."*




### **Dr Erin Marie Saltman, Women and Extremism (WaE)**



Dr Erin Marie Saltman manages the Women and Extremism (WaE) Initiative. Launched by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), WaE is dedicated to developing research around the active and counteractive aspects of women involved in and countering violent extremism in different ways. The initiative brings together

*"My hopes are that the conference can bring together a group of international organisations working on PVE and CVE initiatives that directly bring families into awareness and action."*

### **Brittany Smith, Google Policy**



Brittany Smith works on Google's public policy strategy team, supporting work across Europe on child safety, digital literacy and controversial content. She is responsible for working externally alongside policy allies, and internally coordinating policy support for product and program launches. Having recently earned her MSc in women's studies and public policy, her personal and professional interests lie at the intersection of Internet policy and rights advocacy.

### **The Rt Hon Mark Simmonds**




The Rt Hon Mark Simmonds is COO of the Counter Extremism Project UK and is a Senior Advisor at Kroll. Under the previous Government he served as the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister with responsibility for Africa, the Caribbean and Conflict Resolution. Mark has chaired the United Nations Security Council on two occasions.

*"Families can play an incredibly positive role in curbing radicalisation and terrorism. We need to see what more can be done to facilitate and guide this in new CVE strategies"*




## **Georges Salines, Victim of Extremism and Activist**



Georges Salines is a 59 years old public health physician. He is married and had three children, two boys and a girl, Lola, who was killed during the terrorist attack at the Bataclan concert hall on November 13th, 2015. Lola was 28. Georges created, with other victims, and victims' friends and relatives a NGO named "13 novembre : fraternité et vérité" (November 13: fraternity and truth). This organisation has about 400 members. Its goals are to promote solidarity between victims, to fight for their rights, to act for truth and prevention of terrorism. Georges is its chairman.

*"I am looking forward to meeting FATE and its members and learning how we could act together in order to prevent terrorism."*

## **Henry Tuck, Manager of Extreme Dialogue**



Henry Tuck is a Policy & Research Manager at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue. Henry currently manages the Institute's educational programme, Extreme Dialogue, which aims to enhance critical thinking skills and resilience among young people, and is involved across various projects to counter extremism online. He holds a Masters in International Conflict Studies from Kings College London and a BA from Durham University.

*"I am looking forward to hearing directly from family members on their personal experiences, connecting with other organisations working in the education sector or with a focus on*

*children/safeguarding, and also to generate ideas from the diverse range of participants in the workshop.*

*In terms of FATE more generally, I am excited to see the impact a coordinated, international campaign involving multiple organisations can have in terms of amplifying existing messages and reaching beyond the traditional CVE social media audience.*

## **Latifa Ibn Ziaten, Association Imad Ibn Ziaten pour la Jeunesse et la Paix**



Latifa Ibn Ziaten is a Franco Moroccan activist who founded Imad Ibn Ziaten Association for Youth and Peace after her son was assassinated by Mohamed Merah in Toulouse. The association aims to intervene on behalf of children, young adults, students of all social backgrounds, and prison detainees in order to promote authentic interreligious dialogue and secularism. Mrs. Ibn Ziaten has won many honours, as well as regular support from the Minister of Education, for her organisation. Notably, she received the Prize for Conflict Prevention in 2015 from the Chirac Foundation. This year, she was awarded the International Women of Courage Award and received the Légion d'honneur from President Francois Hollande.



**Here to Help at the FATE Summit**

**Julia Ebner**



**Georgia Dalton**



**Zoe Gorman**



**Victoria Chen**



**Joshua Cheung**







Families Against Terrorism & Extremism

## Fate Summit Programme

### DAY 1 - THURSDAY 28TH APRIL

- 0900**                    **REGISTRATION AND COFFEE**
- 0930**                    **WELCOME** – Compère: **Jonathan Russell**, FATE Coordinator
- 0945**                    **KEYNOTE ADDRESS**  
**Haras Rafiq**, Managing Director, Quilliam
- 1000**                    **PERSONAL TESTIMONY + Q&A** - Chair: **Daniel Kohler**, GIRDS  
**Michael Evans**, brother of jihadist Abdul Hakim, born Thomas Evans  
**Georges Salines**, father of Lola Salines, victim of Paris attacks at the Bataclan  
**Christianne Boudreau**, mother of Damian Clairmont who died in Syria  
**Dominique Bons**, mother of Nicolas Bons who died in Syria  
**Saliha Ben Ali**, mother of Sabri Ben Ali who died in Syria  
**Lorin LaFave**, Founder and Director, The Breck Foundation  
**Karolina Dam**, Founder, Sons and Daughters
- 1100**                    **COFFEE**
- 1115**                    **KEYNOTE ADDRESS**  
**Baroness Pauline Neville-Jones**, Former Minister of State, UK Home Office
- 1145**                    **THE STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM**  
**Rt. Hon. Mark Simonds**, Counter-Extremism Project
- 1215**                    **BUFFET LUNCH**
- 1315**                    **BRIDGING ONLINE AND OFFLINE CVE**



Iris Boyer, Facebook

**1345**      **ENGAGING FAMILIES IN CVE - Chair: TBA**  
**Stephane Gicquel**, Secretary General, Fenvac  
**Nadia Remadna**, Founder and Director, Brigade des Mères  
**Karolina Dam**, Sons And Daughters of the World  
**Shaykh Paul Salahuddin Armstrong**, Director, Association of British Muslims  
**Stephen Edgeley**, Prevent Manager, ORCA Health Group

**1445**      **COFFEE**


**1500**      **EQUIPPING FAMILIES WITH CVE SKILLS**  
**Daniel Koehler**, Director, GIRDS

**1530**      **QUESTION TIME: EFFECTIVE COUNTERSPEECH - Brittany Smith, Google**  
**Vidhya Ramalingam**, Director, Moonshoot CVE  
**Dr. Erin Saltman**, Manager, Women against Extremism  
**Björn Ihler**, Extremely Together  
**Jonathan Russell**, Head of Policy, Quilliam

**1630**      **OPTIONAL DOCUMENTARY VIEWING: A JIHADI IN THE FAMILY**  
Followed by Q&A with **Christianne Boudreau**

**1800**      **END OF DAY 1**





## DAY 2 - FRIDAY 29TH APRIL

- 0900            **PRESS CONFERENCE – SOLIDARITY WITH FAMILIES**
- 0930            **THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF FAMILIES IN CVE**  
Nikita Malik, Fempower
- 1000            **THE EMOTIONAL IMPACT OF TERRORISM ON FAMILIES**  
Latifa Ibn Ziaten, Imad ibn Ziaten youth association for peace
- 1030            **THE POWER OF MOTHERS IN PREVENTING RADICALISATION**  
Edit Schlaffer, Founder and Director, Women without Borders
- 1100            **COFFEE**
- 1115            **FIND FATE NEAR YOU – Chair: Christianne Boudreau**  
Counter-Extremism Project, international CVE organization, global  
Anissa Akhandaf, Counter extremism manager and practitioner in Belgium  
ARKTOS, Community resilience group, Belgium  
Sons and Daughters of the World, family-oriented CVE group, Denmark  
180GradWende, grassroots prevention, Germany  
Sisters Against Violent Extremism, convening women vs extremism, Austria  
The Dialogue Society, Hizmet-inspired CVE Group, Global  
Réveil Citoyen, Social cohesion Think Tank, France  
Association of British Muslims, Britain's oldest Muslim organisation, UK  
TERRA, European project for the prevention of radicalisation, EU  
The Breck Foundation, digital literacy and online safeguarding group, UK
- 1230            **BUFFET LUNCH**
- 1330            **BREAKOUT WORKSHOPS (rotating)**



- Workshop I*     **PREVENTING PATHWAYS TO RADICALISATION - Adam Deen**, Former Extremist. For 8 years, Adam Deen served on the leadership of a hard line Islamist organisation called Al Muhajiroun. Adam has firsthand knowledge of the diverse pathways into radicalisation and how vulnerable people are exploited. Since leaving the group, Adam has dedicated his life to campaigning against his former ideology.
- Workshop II*     **SAFEGUARDING YOUNG PEOPLE - Caroline Hurst**, Childnet.  
Defeating extremism and terrorism is as much about physical security as it is about the battle for ideas. The internet plays a crucial role in the recruitment efforts of various extremist organisations. Digital literacy and critical consumption skills are therefore vital in helping young people deflect extremist narratives and using the internet safely.
- Workshop III*     **CREATIVE ENGAGEMENT & NETWORK ACTIVISM - Henry Tuck**, Extreme Dialogue. In order to effectively combat extreme narratives in the long run, we need to nurture the organic growth of counter and alternative narratives. It is particularly important that we engage young people, who are ultimately the target audience, and encourage them to express themselves openly – whether through debate, social media, or creative projects.
- Workshop IV*     **SUPPORTING & EMPOWERING FAMILIES - Elizabeth Johnston**, EFUS. Efus presents their approach to preventing radicalisation at the local level, particularly in regards to supporting and empowering families. Efus will present how it has integrated this topic within its existing initiatives, giving examples on how families can be supported to contribute within prevention measures.
- 1500**             **COFFEE BREAK**
- 1515**             **FATE IN THE FUTURE – Chair - Jonathan Russell**, FATE Coordinator  
**Haras Rafiq**, Managing Director, Quilliam  
**Edit Schlaffer**, Founder and Director, Women without Borders  
**Karolina Dam**, Sons and Daughters of the World
- 1630**             **END OF SUMMIT**





Nationality					
Affiliation					
Age	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-55	60+
Are you a parent?					

Other Comments?



**How do you rate the video 'Graduation'?** 1 2 3 4 5

Other Comments?

**What is the chance you'll stay in touch with FATE?** 1 2 3 4 5

Other Comments?

**How would you like to see FATE operating in the future? Please circle one or two options.**

Online Engagement      Regular Meetings      Local FATE events

Training Sessions      Annual Meetings      Occasional Contact

Other Comments?

**Where do you need resources/help? Please circle one or two options.**

More training      Social Media Support      Networking

Mentoring      Government Liaison      Media Engagement

Other comments?

**Please rate the workshop: 'In and out of Extremism'?** 1 2 3 4 5

Other Comments?

**Please rate the workshop: 'Safe Guarding Young People'** 1 2 3 4 5

Other Comments?

**Please rate the workshop: 'Network Activism'** 1 2 3 4 5

Other Comments?

**Please rate the workshop: 'Empowering families'** 1 2 3 4 5

Other Comments?


**Could you recommend an organisation or group who we should approach to involve in FATE? Do you have any other comments?**







## Countering Violent Extremism: Challenges and Opportunities for Families



### TAWHĪD And Our Duty to Our Parents

# FATE

Families Against Terrorism & Extremism



QUILLIAM

By Nikita Malik and Jonathan Russell



Quilliam is the world's first counter-extremism think tank, set up to address the unique challenges of citizenship, identity, and belonging in a globalized world. Quilliam stands for religious freedom, equality, human rights, and democracy. Challenging extremism is the duty of all responsible members of society, not least because cultural insularity and extremism are products of the failures of wider society to foster a shared sense of belonging and to advance democratic values. Quilliam seeks to challenge what we think and the way we think. It aims to generate creative, informed, and inclusive discussions to counter the ideological underpinnings of terrorism, while simultaneously providing evidence-based recommendations to governments for related policy measures.

Nikita Malik is a Senior Researcher at Quilliam. Her work focuses on women, families, and extremism, child soldiers of the Islamic State, and terrorism in South Asia. She has authored three reports: "The Children of Islamic State", "Caliphettes: Women and the Appeal of the Islamic State", and "South Asian Terrorist Groups and Global Jihad in 2015". Nikita has presented findings of these reports to EU and UK Parliament and has written for the Wall Street Journal, Newsweek, the Telegraph, and others. She has appeared on Sky, BBC, CNBC, and CNN (where she was interviewed by Amanpour on female jihadists). Nikita speaks at schools as part of Quilliam's extensive outreach.

Jonathan Russell is Quilliam's Head of Policy. He runs the Policy Department which is responsible for several of Quilliam's programmes, its relations with policymakers, providing evidence-based policy advice, and managing our external communications. Jonathan's work involves maintaining Quilliam's position as a non-partisan counter-extremism think-tank; campaigning for a cross-party commitment to progressive, effective and human-rights friendly counter-terrorism and counter-extremism approaches; evidence-based policy advice work package for the EU-funded TERRA II; the #NotAnotherBrother counter-narrative campaign; consultancy work for public and private sector partners all around the world; management of FATE (Families Against Terrorism and Extremism); and the coordination of the joint Kofi Annan Foundation-One Young World project to find 10 young advocates to counter-extremism.

Families Against Terrorism and Extremism (FATE) is a grassroots network of organisations, families and individuals at the forefront of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) across Europe. FATE looks beyond the immediate security environment and into the future. FATE unites, empowers and supports families; to enhance effective cooperation between families and authorities; to raise awareness among young people and the public at large about the spread of violent extremism; to educate all to the signs of radicalisation; and to give families the tools they need to keep young people safe.

The authors would like to thank research assistance provided by Victoria Chen and Julia Ebner, as well as ongoing support from all individuals and organisations involved in Families Against Terrorism and Extremism (FATE.)

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*Families in Violent Extremism: Challenges and Opportunities (April 2016)*

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## PART 1: Challenges

### Introduction

Remarkably little attention has been paid to the part of families in the process of radicalisation. Yet one has to only look at the news to see recent events of brothers, couples, and mothers justifying, encouraging and supporting the martyrdom of close relatives for the cause of jihad. More research needs to look into the psychological and social dynamics behind such cases. A better understanding of the role of spouses, siblings or other family members in influencing and encouraging each other to undertake violent acts as well as the deriving potential for parents and close relatives to prevent their children from joining extremist networks could help us engage families more proactively and effectively in the fight against terrorism.

The present literature conducted in this field can be divided into two camps. First are those that argue that families have little or no understanding of the radicalisation that takes place under their noses, and within their homes. The second consists of those that believe families have an active role to play in reinforcing the radicalisation process.

Extremist groups create a sense of community, frequently embedded in a strong transnational support network, to form a core sense of identity for young people, which can rival the sense of belonging they feel within their own families. As such, these groups can serve as substitutes for families, providing individuals with a sense of community, belonging, and 'family-like' members to substitute their real families. In these situations, it is unlikely that families actively know, or participate in, the radicalisation of their relatives.

However, research has also shown that extremist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood<sup>1</sup>, Al Qaeda, and Islamic State have long incentivised young individuals to join their organisations with the approval of their parents, and otherwise, at the expense of it. In some Islamist movements such as Hamas and Hezbollah, families are even actively used as part of the martyrdom process to justify the ideological underpinnings of a cause and the sustainability of the movements themselves. This situation occurs when extremist groups compliment families who justify and glorify jihad to mobilise more members of their communities for their cause, as is often seen in the cases of movements such as Hamas and Hezbollah. Here, it is clear that families play some role in the radicalisation process.

Most existing work on the role of families and communities in strengthening resilience against extremism, both violent and non-violent, recognises that family can be key factors both in

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<sup>1</sup> See, for example, the work of Benjamin Wallace-Wells "Terrorists in the Family", *The New Yorker*, 24 March 2016. Accessible at: <http://www.newyorker.com/news/benjamin-wallace-wells/terrorists-in-the-family>

<sup>2</sup> The Muslim Brotherhood is Egypt's oldest and largest Islamist organisation, founded by Hassan al-Banna in 1928. It has influenced Islamist movements worldwide and mixes political activism with charity work. The term *ikhwan* literally means 'brother' in Arabic, enticing a relationship of brotherhood, sisterhood (Sisters in Islam), and family amongst its members.



detering people from extremism and in fomenting it. This rests, of course, on the premise that families act “as a conduit of values and traditions... [and shape] the worldviews of children and youth”<sup>3</sup>. Through various studies, it is clear that trust in family members is high in comparison to trust in police and government officials, which is low<sup>4</sup>. When examining the family, it is therefore important to look at the role that mothers, fathers, and the space of family life in general can play in countering violent extremism.

## Extremist Groups as Substitutes to Family

### *Identity and meaning making*

Much of what has been written about extremist groups concentrates on questions related to identity and concludes that the sense of belonging that movements provide to their members often facilitates an ‘insider-outsider’ complex<sup>5</sup>. Melucci’s (1995, 44-45) description of social movements as being defined by a “language that is...specific to the group...incorporate[d] in a given set of rituals, practices, cultural artefacts”<sup>6</sup> is similarly applicable to the shared sense of ritualism, routine, reward, and punishment that take place within the private realm of the family space. The repetition of these rituals is self-perpetuating, and provides a strong sense of collective identity and solidarity, leading to members becoming “entwined through ideological, educational, political, or social networks.”<sup>7</sup> This indicates that an important element of both families and social movements is a shared history, whereby members can motivate, comfort, and speak for each other.

Islamist movements follow the repertoires set out within mainstream social movement theory, echoing sound organisational structures, collective identity, dynamism, and a sense of solidarity.<sup>8</sup> Melucci goes so far as to argue that all collective action is rooted in identity construction, contingent upon culturally and historically constructed notions of ‘the public’ and the ‘private’, based on informal networks as a strategy for mobilisation and a conduit for the constant regeneration of a ‘meaning machine’<sup>9</sup>.

In this vein, some researchers – including Raffie<sup>10</sup> and Eatwell<sup>11</sup> – have illustrated that isolation and lack of companionship felt by Muslims of the expatriate community increases the risk of them

<sup>3</sup> Bhulai, Fink, Zeiger. Global Center on Cooperative Security. 2014. *The Roles of Families and Communities in Strengthening Community Resilience Against Violent Extremism*. The report focuses on outcomes of a series of meetings with people from over 14 countries through a number of workshops. Mentions a participant who called terrorism a “family affair” to highlight the importance family has in disseminating ideas, but does not delve further into this.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Insider-outsider theory is primarily used in the realm of economics, whereby some individuals enjoy more privileged positions than others.

<sup>6</sup> Melucci, A. 1995. *The process of collective identity*. In: Johnston, H. et al. eds. *Social movements and culture*. 4. Minnesota: University of Minnesota, pp. 41-63.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid: 44-45

<sup>8</sup> Singerman, D. 1995. *Avenues of participation: family, politics, and networks in urban quarters of Cairo*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 143.

<sup>9</sup> Melucci 1995: 41-63.

<sup>10</sup> Al Raffie, D. 2013. “Social Identity Theory for Investigating Islamic Extremism in the Diaspora.” *Journal of Strategic Security* 6, no. 4, pp. 67-91.

<sup>11</sup> Eatwell, R. & Goodwin, M. 2010. *The new extremism in 21<sup>st</sup> century Britain*, Routledge



abandoning their families to join new Islamist groups. Portes<sup>12</sup> in particular ventured that second and third generation immigrants compare their position in society with their host population as opposed to their immigrant parents' generation or their own ancestral homeland. This leads to more dissatisfaction and sensitivity to discrimination, causing isolation and the need for companionship amongst other like-minded individuals. Within social groups, members undergo a "long period of intense social interaction with a small group of friends, developing a strong mutual intimacy, which relieves their previous social isolation"<sup>13</sup>.

Jonas et al (2002) have discussed how images of death are used to solidify the 'mortality salience' effect which is usually used to increase pride in one's country, race, religion but can equally increase support in extremism when it is linked to group identity.<sup>14</sup> Likewise, some literature argues that religious identity among Muslims can replace geographically defined identities of first generation immigrants, as British-born Muslims have no experience of their parents' home countries (Jacobson, 1998; Samad 1998; Duderija 2008; Meer 2008)<sup>15</sup>. An increase in religiosity can therefore have little or nothing to do with religiousness and religion itself<sup>16</sup>.

#### *Networks and movement theory: The Ummah*

The appeal of Islamist movements consequently lies in helping individuals form their sense of identity, and to create a new meaning of family. Kinship terms such as 'brother', 'sister', 'Ummah' are used interchangeably to bring in a sense of community, juxtaposed with religious terms to fulfil a sense of higher purpose. For example, several authors<sup>17</sup> have identified a wider Muslim community – the 'Ummah' – to play a big role in connecting Muslims across the globe. There are "serious consequences when [an] individual perceives that some Muslim communities are being treated brutally and unfairly".<sup>18</sup> This is consistent with the work of Wiktorowicz (2004)<sup>19</sup> who argues that Islamist activism stems from grievances that are translated into Islamic language to mobilise people.

Since Islamist movements are transnational in nature, their call to action mobilises "thousands of Muslims from Sudan, Egypt, Palestine, England, France, Algeria and many other countries"<sup>20</sup> who are incentivised to protect other Muslims in Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Chechnya who have

<sup>12</sup> Portes, A. 1984, "The rise of ethnicity: Determinants of ethnic perceptions among Cuban exiles in Miami". *American Sociological Review*, pp. 383-397.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Jonas, E., Schimel, J., Greenberg, J. and Pyszczynski, T., 2002. The Scrooge effect: Evidence that mortality salience increases prosocial attitudes and behaviour. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 28(10), pp.1342-1353.

<sup>15</sup> Jacobson, J., 2006. Islam in transition: religion and identity among British Pakistani youth. Routledge; Samad, Y., 1998. Media and Muslim identity: Intersections of generation and gender. *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research*, 11(4), pp.425-438; Duderija, A., 2008. Factors Determining Religious Identity Construction among Western-born Muslims: Towards a Theoretical Framework. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 28(3), pp.371-400; Meer, N., 2008. The politics of voluntary and involuntary identities: are Muslims in Britain an ethnic, racial or religious minority? *Patterns of prejudice*, 42(1), pp.61-81. Cited in Eatwell, R. 2010. *The new extremism in 21st century Britain*. Routledge.

<sup>16</sup> Eatwell, 2010: 61-81.

<sup>17</sup> Silke, A. 2008. "Holy Warriors," *European Journal of Criminology*. 5. pp.110.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Wiktorowicz, Q., 2004. *Islamic activism: A social movement theory approach*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid – p. 157.



experienced violence, brutality, and oppression. As such, the Ummah is a global community of Muslims which is used within wider radical Islamic movements. For example, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestinian territories seek to bring about an Islamic Palestinian nation-state. Elements within Al Qaeda and associated groups – including *Islamic Jihad* and *al-Gamaat al-Islamiyya* from Egypt, *Harkat al Jihad* in Bangladesh, and *Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan* – emphasize instead on achieving a global Islamic community, the Ummah, and adapting divine law to the modern world.<sup>21</sup>

Islamist groups can help to form the personal identity of recruits and also function as an alternative social network. Silke writes about how the Muslim Brotherhood hosts study groups, monthly meetings, workshops, and conferences to attract and retain members to their cause<sup>22</sup>.

“Much like the Christian fundamentalists, Brothers spend endless hours convincing potential converts of righteousness of their cause – the Brotherhood also attempts to integrate all dimensions of the individual's life within the Brotherhood's 'family'. Prayer and service combine to create the sense of kinship so crucial in Middle Eastern life. Many young people in the Islamic world are bewildered, and the Brotherhood provides them with the sense of belonging and purpose that they so desperately need.”<sup>23</sup>

This is consistent with the work of Asef Bayat, who writes that “Islamism [...] refer[s] to those ideologies and movements that strive to establish some kind of 'Islamic order' – a religious state, shari'a law, and moral codes in Muslim societies and communities”<sup>24</sup>. Similarly, Al-Turabi and Esposito argue that the “Islamic state is based on the idea that 'Islam is a comprehensive way of life', thus there should be no divide between public and private, state and society”<sup>25</sup>.

#### *Parents and extremism*

To understand the role of parents in the extremism process one must examine the resources available to them, the degree of religiosity in the family space and generational struggles consisting of deprivation, feelings of powerlessness, and low self-esteem. Wictorowicz uses a case study of the extremist group al-Muhajiroun to describe how primary social pressure comes from parents on their children to engage in Islamic institutions and practices, but not social or political activism<sup>26</sup>. This first generation of parents, primarily of the South Asian diaspora

<sup>21</sup> Sutton, P. and Vertigans, S., 2006. Islamic "new social movements"? Radical Islam, al-Qa'ida and social movement theory. *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, 11(1), pp.101-115.

<sup>22</sup> Silke, A., 2008. Holy warriors exploring the psychological processes of Jihadi radicalization. *European journal of criminology*, 5(1), pp.99-123. This mentoring, recruiting and community-building effort is seen in various terrorist organizations. For example, the PKK and Turkish Hezbollah uses summer camps to recruit children, where some of the attendees are sent to the mountains rather than their homes at the end of the session (Kule, A and Gül, Z. 2015. How Individuals Join Terrorist Organizations in Turkey: An Empirical Study on DHKP-C, PKK and Turkish Hezbollah. *A Journal of Policy and Strategy*, vol. 1, iss. 1, pp 35.). This strategy could be used if the organization fears that the child's family would de-radicalise them upon return.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid: 42.

<sup>24</sup> Bayat, A. ed., 2013. *Post-Islamism: The Many Faces of Political Islam*. OUP USA, pp. 4.

<sup>25</sup> Al-Turabi, H, and Esposito, J. 1983, *Voices of Resurgent Islam*. New York, Oxford University Press, pp. 241.

<sup>26</sup> Wiktrowicz, Q., 2005. *Radical Islam rising: Muslim extremism in the West*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. p. 55.



community, usually want to return to their country of origin, and have little interest in radicalisation process – their version of Islam is 'personal, apolitical Islam, [which sets] different goals... on rituals...getting an education, working hard"<sup>27</sup>

Case studies indicate that opposition to radicalisation can even come from siblings, who emphasise "praying when you can, focus on work and studies, and not being politically active"<sup>28</sup>. In these communities, respect for parents is of high importance, and activists tend to hide their involvement<sup>29</sup>. Others such as Esposito have shown that radicals tend to "lack concern with family problems and wishes of parents and older brothers".<sup>30</sup>

Work by Sieckelinck and de Winter examines the role that families – and mothers in particular – play in deradicalisation. Their results seem to suggest that family influence is not a determinant of extremism, with youth from all backgrounds getting involved in extremism and "all had siblings who did not become involved in violence"<sup>31</sup>. They mention one case of direct cause of radicalisation from mother to child, but this was unusual and for the most part external factors seemed to contribute to radicalisation. Their study also shows that wives preferred their husbands not to be involved in radicalisation.

#### *Marital status and extremism*

When examining the role of marriage, Sageman (2004)<sup>32</sup> found that 73% of members of Islamist movements were married, and most of these men had children. Bakker (2006)<sup>33</sup> found high levels of marriage among jihadis was due to a need for companionship, and 'family commitments have clearly not prevented individuals from embracing jihad'<sup>34</sup>. Sageman's (2004) results on Al Qaeda, which revealed that 70% of members of groups such as al-Qaeda were married, indicated that many jihadist marriages were to wives who shared the same 'strong ideological beliefs'<sup>35</sup> that supported jihadism (or married to women whose families shared such beliefs), as such, marriage provided an 'essentially endorsing environment for jihadist views as opposed to a restraining influence'<sup>36</sup>. Hence while wives may prefer their husbands not to be involved in extremism, when both individuals and their families were radicalised, interpretations were mutually reinforced.

In the same vein, Warr (1998)<sup>37</sup> has argued that marriage decreases illegal behaviour when it lessens peer interaction, working on the assumption that marriage reduces time spent with

<sup>27</sup> Ibid: 56.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> Esposito, J.L., 1999. The Islamic threat: Myth or reality?. Oxford University Press. pp. 94.

<sup>31</sup> Sieckelinck, S and de Winter, M. "Formers and Families: Transitional journeys in and out of extremisms in the United Kingdom, Denmark and The Netherlands." National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism. pp. 66

<sup>32</sup> Sageman, M., 2004. Understanding terror networks. University of Pennsylvania Press.

<sup>33</sup> Bakker, E., 2006. Jihadi terrorists in Europe, their characteristics and the circumstances in which they joined the jihad; an exploratory study.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid: 107.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid: 109.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> Warr, M. 1998. Life-course transitions and desistance from crime. Criminology 36, pp. 183–216. Cited in pp. 109 Silke, A., 2008. Holy warriors exploring the psychological processes of Jihadi radicalization. *European journal of criminology*, 5(1), pp.99-123.



friends and fellow radicals, and as such reduces exposure to 'delinquent peers'. In the case where both individuals within the couple are jihadist, this effect does not occur and peer interactions remain key in the lives of the extremists as they are radicalised<sup>38</sup>.

Speckhard and Akhmedova's study to understand the psychological reasons behind Chechen terrorist attacks conducted interviews in 2003—2005 with close family members or associates of 34 subjects, 26 of which were female suicide terrorists.<sup>39</sup> For the female population examined, at 50% the most common suicide bombers were single, followed by widowed females, at 19.2%. Likewise, the majority of the male population were single, comprising 62.5% of the sample, followed by married at 25%, and widowed at 12.5%.<sup>40</sup> The study found that all respondents increased religiosity following deep personal traumatic experiences, with only 20% of respondents reportedly having been already somewhat involved with militant ideology before their transformation to radicalisation.<sup>41</sup>

Wiktorowicz's argument that Islamist activism stems from grievances is reflected in the case of Chechen suicide bombers, where grievances stem from the loss of a loved one, or from a feeling of destitution. Those who have been radicalised by strong emotional grievances serve as the best suicide attackers because they are wholeheartedly committed to seeking revenge. On the other hand, Chechen women are often "pawns in a man's game," where they are rape victims who are blackmailed or brainwashed to their deaths.<sup>42</sup>

The case study of Zarema Muzhakhoyeva who was arrested after attempts to carry out a suicide attack does not feature a woman avenging the loss of a loved one, but rather a destitute and desperate woman who was so gravely indebted to Chechen independence fighters. The instance of sisters Fatima and Khadzhad Ganiyeva shows another case of males exploiting Chechen females, rather than a pursuit of personal vengeance. Both sisters carried out suicide attacks in the Dubrovka theatre siege in 2002, where it was later revealed that their brother Rustam Ganiyev had been paid \$1,500 to each sister.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> Speckhard, A and Akhmedova, K. 2006. The New Chechen Jihad: Militant Wahhabism as a Radical Movement and a Source of Suicide Terrorism in Post-War Chechen Society, *Democracy and Security*, 2:1, pp 125.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid: 126

<sup>41</sup> Three respondents were married to spouses who held Wahhabist beliefs and militant Wahhabist ideology, another three were sisters of Wahhabists whose brothers were killed or disappeared, and one was married to and was the sister of Wahhabists, both of whom were killed in war (Ibid: 134).

<sup>42</sup> Irina Filipova, a teacher in Moscow who was held hostage at the Dubrovka theatre siege in October 2002 expressed sympathies for Chechen women, where "a Chechen friend told me they must have been raped—which means in Chechnya you can never marry or have children, so you might as well die." (Groskop, Viv. 2004. "Chechnya's Deadly "Black Widows" *New Statesmen*. pp 1-4)

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.



## Extremist Groups as Complements to Family

Alternative to the idea that extremist groups serve as a substitute to the family environment is the premise that radicalisation is initiated, or supported by, the family. For example, Burke (2015) cites *The New America* study which shows that more than 25% of westerners who went to fight abroad had connections to extremism<sup>44</sup>, and “of those western fighters with familial ties to jihad, three-fifths had a relative who has also left for Syria.”<sup>45</sup> He references a second study, from Pennsylvania State University, that examined 120 lone wolf terrorists and their interactions with family and friends and found that, “even though they launched their attacks alone, in a large majority of the cases *others were aware* of the individual's commitment to a specific extremist ideology”<sup>46</sup>. In 64% of cases, family and friends knew about the person's intent to commit an attack of some sort because they were directly told about it<sup>47</sup>.

Dr. Rik Coolsaet, a Belgian expert, says that recruitment is based more on “kinship and friendship” than on anything else. According to him, the path to terrorism, like any form of non-violent or violent activism, should be considered as a highly social process in which “people become interested in ideas, ideologies and activities (...) because other people are interested in them”.<sup>48</sup> Marc Sageman also supports this thesis, stating that recruitment is “a bottom-up process rather than a top-down seek out and recruit process.”<sup>49</sup> While this is consistent with social network theory, the family plays a central role in facilitating the process by directly fuelling the interest of extremist ideas to their relatives.<sup>50</sup>

In the same disposition, Majoran examines the unique role that women play as powerful actors in the deradicalisation process. He states that, “women's roles as mothers and wives offer an opportunity for women to act as powerful role models against violent extremism, *as the* shapers of familial and social norms, and promoters of tolerance and societal engagement”<sup>51</sup>. He also mentions that “children listen to their mothers because they view them as figures of respect and authority.” It is no great leap to argue that if women play a key role as figureheads in the deradicalisation process, they could equally play an active role in the radicalisation process. For example, in the West Bank, women involved in extremist groups rose 22% in a decade, whereas women carried out majority of suicide attacks in Chechnya.<sup>52</sup>

<sup>44</sup> Burke, J. 2015. “‘Jihad by family’: Why are terrorist cells often made up of brothers?”. *The Guardian*.

<sup>45</sup> Bergen, P and Schuster, C and Sterman, D 2015. “ISIS in the West: The New Faces of Extremism” *New America*. pp 8. Accessible at: <https://www.newamerica.org/>

<sup>46</sup> Gill, P. 2013. Seven Findings on Lone-Actor Terrorists. *International centre for the Study of Terrorism*. Accessible at: <http://sites.psu.edu/icst/2013/02/06/seven-findings-on-lone-actor-terrorists/> Emphasis by Author.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Burke, J. 2015. “‘Jihad by family’: Why are terrorist cells often made up of brothers?”. *The Guardian*.

<sup>49</sup> 2009. *Theoretical Frames on Pathways to Violent Radicalization*. Artis: Research & Risk Modeling. pp. 8.

<sup>50</sup> 9.8% of Turkish terrorist organizations (such as the PKK, DHKP-C, and Turkish Hezbollah) were recruited by relatives and 8.8% by family members. (Kule, A and Gül, Z. 2015. How Individuals Join Terrorist Organizations in Turkey: An Empirical Study on DHKP-C, PKK and Turkish Hezbollah. *A Journal of Policy and Strategy*, vol. 1, iss. 1, pp 15-47.)

<sup>51</sup> “Mothers & Wives: Women's Potential Role in Countering Violent Extremism.” Andrew Majoran. Mackenzie Institute. <http://mackenzieinstitute.com/mothers-wives-womens-potential-role-countering-violent-extremism/>

<sup>52</sup> See for example data bases compiled by Yoram Schweitzer



While it is difficult to understand exactly why it is people join extremist groups, “multiple studies have reinforced the conclusion that individuals are influenced in their decisions to become involved in political violence by their peers—for example, friends and family.”<sup>53</sup> Donatella Della Porta found, in a study of the Italian Red Brigades in the 1990s, “that most operatives had joined because of the influence of peers and family members.” This trend has been confirmed in studies relating to Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups across the world<sup>54</sup>. Through the study on extremism in the West Bank, Cragin et al. found that “social ties often are cited as one of the key factors affecting attitudes toward violence and a willingness to engage in political violence.”<sup>55</sup> However, parental influence was found to be a key factor in being able to counter radicalisation, with those growing up with little parental influence found to be more likely to engage in violence.<sup>56</sup> They suggest, in their conclusion, that there is a divergence in the effect that friends and family have, with family being more important than friends.<sup>57</sup> As such families can play a key role in countering extremism, or conversely, in facilitating it.

Moreover, Christmann conducted a review of scholarly material on reasons for extremism. One of the key reasons included in the review was “the power of love” – joining a radical group through family, friends, or spouses<sup>58</sup>. This is consistent with the role that social bonds and networks play in the radicalisation process, including families. Most extremists identify having close social ties to people somehow involved in terrorism as a risk factor<sup>59</sup>. As a whole, though, the paper seems to focus on political and social grievances as the main factor for radicalisation, although family does play a role<sup>60</sup>.

Marc Sageman (a psychiatrist and former CIA agent) says that familial ties in terrorism are a natural phenomenon. “You develop your social identity first by talking to those close to you. And at first those close to you are of course your brothers and childhood friends... It’s what I call the activation of the social identity. It’s a question of proximity. That’s why there are so many brothers, sometimes sisters, neighbourhood friends. They grow up together. They invent for themselves an identity as defenders of an Islam under attack, of women and children killed in airstrikes. They radicalize and reinforce each other.”<sup>61</sup> McAdam and Paulsen (1993) argue that “knowing someone who is already involved is one of the strongest predictors of recruitment into the

<sup>53</sup> Cragin, K and Bradley, M and Robinson, E and Steinberg, P. “What Factors Cause Youth to Reject Violent Extremism? Results of an Exploratory Analysis in the West Bank.” *RAND Corporation*. Accessible at: [http://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_reports/RR1118.html](http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1118.html), pp. 3.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid: 12.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid: 13; also see Um Iyad, the mother of 14 children case: Davis, J. 2003. *The Mothers of Martyrs: Munabraham Daoud and Um Iyad*. In: *Martyrs: innocence, vengeance, and despair in the Middle East*, Palgrave, New York. pp. 126.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid: 15.

<sup>58</sup> Christmann, K. 2012. “Preventing Religious Radicalisation and Violent Extremism.” *Youth Justice Board for England and Wales*. Accessible at: [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/396030/preventing-violent-extremism-systematic-review.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/396030/preventing-violent-extremism-systematic-review.pdf) p. 19.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid: 33.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> 2016. “Brothers-in-terror: When fraternal bonds lead to extremism.” *Agence France Presse*. Accessible at: <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/World/2016/Mar-24/343800-brothers-in-terror-when-fraternal-bonds-lead-to-extremism.ashx>



membership of a social movement”<sup>62</sup> In his analysis of 242 jihadis, Bakker (2006)<sup>63</sup> found that these individuals tended to be involved in terrorism through networks of friends or relatives, and generally there were no formal ties with global Salafi networks. – within this group context, individuals gradually adopt beliefs and faith of the group’s most extreme members in a psychological process known as *risky shift*--- usually new Salafi faith leads to more isolation from older friends and loyalty towards the group. The idea of a strong group identity and commitment is consistent with Palmer and Palmer who argue that “recruits [are] introduced to jihadists (Taliban) by friends or family. Many of the female jihadists were the wives or daughters of jihadists”<sup>64</sup>

## Case Studies

### *Al Qaeda*

Rejecting Western materialist explanations for the rise of militant Islam, bin Laden stated:

*“They [Western commentators] claim that this blessed awakening and the people reverting to Islam are due to economic factors. This is not so. It is rather a grace from Allah, a desire to embrace the religion of Allah...When the holy war called, **thousands of young men from the Arab Peninsula and other countries answered the call and they came from wealthy backgrounds...** We believe that this is the call we have to answer regardless of our financial capabilities” (1998b) <sup>65</sup>*

Al-Zawahiri (2001) also argues that values radicals hold exceeds material interests and personal loyalties they “*have abandoned their families, country, wealth, studies, and job in search for jihad arenas for the sake of God*”<sup>66</sup>. Tarrow (1998:113) writes that this use of Islamic references is key to “framing protest and collective action in strongly religious terms, deferring to a higher power and tapping into highly significant culturally embedded ideas of ‘holy war’”, this in itself increases legitimacy to “ideologically committed violent actions”<sup>67</sup>. Al Qaeda has recruited volunteers through the religious associations, mosques, community centres, and charities and is able to tap into wider movement through establishing ‘associate members’<sup>68</sup>. This is consistent with Sageman’s (2004) study of international jihadis that found that the beliefs of many militants were gradually formed within friendship groups that became collectively radicalized over time<sup>69</sup>.

<sup>62</sup> McAdam, D. and Paulsen, R., 1993. Specifying the relationship between social ties and activism. *American journal of sociology*, pp. 640-667.

<sup>63</sup> Bakker, 2006.

<sup>64</sup> Palmer, M. and Palmer, P., 2007. Islamic extremism: causes, diversity, and challenges. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 186.

<sup>65</sup> Vertigans, S., 2008. Militant Islam: A sociology of characteristics, causes and consequences. Routledge. pp. 43. Emphasis mine.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid. Emphasis mine.

<sup>67</sup> Tarrow, S.G. 1998, *Power in movement: social movements and contentious politics*, 2, New York; Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press; pp. 113.

<sup>68</sup> Vertigans, S. 2008. Militant Islam: a sociology of characteristics, causes and consequences. Routledge. pp. 107.

<sup>69</sup> Sageman, M., 2004. Understanding terror networks. University of Pennsylvania Press.



*Islamic State*

Children are highly susceptible to indoctrination from people they know, love and respect. This is particularly pertinent to the Islamic State context, because recruiters are able to employ the whole family in the proselytization of the child. In stark contrast with past conflicts, Islamic State recruitment also heavily involves family members in co-opting children into joining the group. Reports of child soldiers in other conflicts reveal that they are sometimes forced to kill family members, both to preclude any possibility of returning home, and to break down the psychological defences of the child.<sup>70</sup> Islamic State, on the other hand, is not just a rebel group, but an aspiring state, and it needs societies, not just soldiers. As such, its recruitment tactics feed into its long-term strategy by enrolling the whole family, not just the youth. Mothers are given books instructing them how to bring up jihadi children, suggestions include telling bedtime stories about martyrdom, exposing children to graphic content through jihadi websites, and encouraging them to play sports and games which improve their fitness and hand-eye coordination.<sup>71</sup> In this way, children are brought up exposed to Islamic State ideology by those they trust and love, consequently making them more likely to trust Islamic State itself. Nevertheless, accounts from former children of the 'caliphate' reveal that their living conditions are trying both mentally and physically, for example, some are forced to sleep on flea-infested mattresses.<sup>72</sup> At this stage their loyalty to the 'caliphate' is crystallised, as they are isolated from their families, and their shared hardship creates strong bonds of camaraderie with their peers, who slowly become their new family. Parents have reported that children recruited by Islamic State often refuse to return home, declaring that they were going to fight jihad for the 'caliphate'.<sup>73</sup>

*But the muwahhid should always remember that he is obliged not to obey his parents in what entails disobedience of Allah as ordered by these āyāt and as the Prophet said, 'there is no obedience to anyone in disobedience of Allah. Obedience is only in good.' [Reported by al-Bukhārī and Muslim from 'Alī]. He also said, 'Upon the Muslim is to listen and obey in regards to what he likes and dislikes, except if he is ordered with sin. If he is ordered with sin, then there is no listening nor obedience [in sin]' [Reported by al-Bukhārī and Muslim from Ibn 'Umar].<sup>74</sup>*

<sup>70</sup> Beber, B and Blattman, C. 2013. 'The Logic of Child Soldiering and Coercion', *International Organization*.

<sup>71</sup> Withnall, A. 2015. 'ISIS Booklet Issues Guidelines to Mothers on How to Raise 'Jihadi Babies'', *The Independent*. Accessible at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-booklet-issues-guidelines-to-mothers-on-how-to-raise-jihadi-babies-9952721.html>.

<sup>72</sup> Bloom, M. 2015. 'Cubs of the Caliphate', *Foreign Affairs*. Accessible at: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-07-21/cubs-caliphate>.

<sup>73</sup> 'Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 September – 10 December 2014', *UNAMI*. pp. 17. Accessible at: [http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI\\_OHCHR\\_Sep\\_Dec\\_2014.pdf](http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_OHCHR_Sep_Dec_2014.pdf)

<sup>74</sup> 2015. "Tawhid and Our Duty to Our Parents". *Dabiq 10*. pp.15. Accessible at: <http://www.clarionproject.org/news/islamic-state-isis-islam-propaganda-magazine-dabiq>.



*Hezbollah*

Hezbollah regularly employs parents to justify the martyrdom of their children in battle. An interview with a mother of a deceased fighter revealed that mothers of radicalised suicide children, or 'martyrs' are given more respect by the community, illustrating the point that a collective space is used to justify radicalisation and violence. Following the death of her child, the mother is "looked after by the party and is frequently invited to visit religious sites in Syria or Iran"<sup>75</sup>. She added, "Do not believe that the mother of a martyr is unhappy. She may cry sometimes but she is happy"<sup>76</sup>. Families of martyred children gain support from the party, as they cover medical, housing, and school expenses.<sup>77</sup> Following on from this interview the mother describes her sons as highly educated and graduated from university and defends her point by stating that they died because they didn't have 'complexities' i.e. it was obligatory for them, but instead because they *wanted* to and were destined to die for their homeland. Another interview with the mother of a martyr claims that her son's greatest duty was to sacrifice himself for his country by killing as many of his enemies as possible and "this is the greatest pride that can befall a mother."<sup>78</sup> Despite instruction not to mourn, mothers still grieved their martyred children, but would encourage their remaining children to join Hezbollah's mission."<sup>79</sup>

*Hamas*

In many communities and societies, terrorist groups and their members are regarded as courageous, honourable, and important. In interviews conducted by Post and Denny, one Palestinian terrorist describes "recruits [being] treated with great respect. A youngster who belonged to Hamas or Fatah was regarded more highly than one who didn't belong to any group, and got better treatment than unaffiliated kids"<sup>80</sup>. Some communities see members of these organisations as 'freedom fighters, rebels, or the resistance'. "After recruitment, my social status was greatly enhanced. I got a lot of respect from my acquaintances, and from the young people in my village"<sup>81</sup>. Palestinian mothers celebrate children's deaths as a worthy cause in the name of God. "Categorizing these dead terrorists as *Shahids* [martyrs] grants them the highest honour a Muslim can achieve, and is therefore cause for a mother to celebrate". Glamourizing and glorifying such inexcusable and unnecessary loss of children makes it seem acceptable as well

<sup>75</sup> 2007. "Hezbollah: The Mothers of Martyrs". Asharq al-Awsat. pp.1 Accessible at: <http://english.aawsat.com/2007/08/article55261820/hezbollah-the-mothers-of-martyrs>.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

<sup>77</sup> For children whose parents became martyrs, Hezbollah provides booklets on how to educate children in remembrance of their family's service (Engelkes, S. 2015. "A Blood Wedding: Hezbollah's *shuhada* and its Culture of Martyrdom". American University of Beirut. pp. 7)

<sup>78</sup> Engelkes, 2015: 7

<sup>79</sup> Cambanis, T. 2010. *A privilege to die: inside Hezbollah's legions and their endless war against Israel*, 1<sup>st</sup> Free Press. Free Press, New York.

<sup>80</sup> Post, J., Sprinzak, E. and Denny, L., 2003. The terrorists in their own words: Interviews with 35 incarcerated Middle Eastern terrorists. *Terrorism and political Violence*, 15(1), pp.171-184 cited in: Silke, A. ed., 2003. *Terrorists, victims and society: Psychological perspectives on terrorism and its consequences*. John Wiley & Sons.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid.



as the noble thing to do, it is almost 'imperative' for mothers to donate or give up their children in the bloody battlefields of so-called religious war, in this case, jihad<sup>82</sup>.

Joyce M Davis's research on martyrs' mothers suggests that a martyred child can diverge a family. In the case of Izzidene al Masri, who committed a suicide attack inside the Sbarro Pizzeria, both his parents were unaware of his radicalisation until after he carried out the attack. Following the wake, Izzidene's parents held conflicting opinions on whether or not the attack was justifiable. Al Masri's father along with his brothers seemed proud of the attacks, and said they were celebrating at his death. Mother Um lyad questioned her son's death and spoke of her regrets, in which her husband "simply shook his head and walked away."<sup>83</sup>

In 2002, Knight Ridder Newspaper correspondent Alfonso Chardy conducted interviews with Palestinian psychologists who reported parents were increasingly asking them for help. Radicalized children will not only internally divide families, but some psychologists predict a potential battle between parents and militants over youths.<sup>84</sup>

A video posted by Palestinian Media Watch films Um Nidal with her son, Muhammad, who is armed and ready to carry out a terror attack:

*"We do love our children, but also our homeland"*<sup>85</sup>

*"By Allah, today is the best day of my life. I feel that our Lord is pleased with me, because I am offering something [my son] for Him. I wish to sacrifice more [sons] for Allah's forgiveness, and for the flag [of Islam], 'There is no god but Allah', to fly over Palestine.... It's true that there's nothing more precious than children, but for the sake of Allah – what is precious becomes cheap."*<sup>86</sup>

It became common occurrence in the Palestinian context that a child would leave his home and be brought back a 'martyr.' Mothers of martyrs become the ultimate victims of the tragic situation that they find themselves in. They are unable to mourn their martyred sons in a culture, which believes that martyrs are to be prized and not mourned. Those mothers turn to God for assurance and consolation. They are consoled by the myth of the 'Martyr's Paradise' which assures them that their martyred children are in the presence of God and that they are enjoying a better kind of life<sup>87</sup>.

<sup>82</sup> 2016 "Parents celebrate children's death" Official Palestinian Authority TV. Accessible at: <http://www.palwatch.org/main.aspx?fi=479>

<sup>83</sup> Davis, J. 2003. The Mothers of Martyrs: Munabrahim Daoud and Um lyad. In: *Martyrs: innocence, vengeance, and despair in the Middle East*, Palgrave, New York. pp. 121-135.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid: 127.

<sup>85</sup> Marcus, I and Zilberdik, N. 2015. "Why Palestinian mothers make joyful cries for their martyred sons" Official Palestinian Authority TV. Accessible at: [http://palwatch.org/main.aspx?fi=157&doc\\_id=14437](http://palwatch.org/main.aspx?fi=157&doc_id=14437)

<sup>86</sup> "Son's death was 'best day of my life', says Palestinian mother". PMW Video. 22 July 2009. Accessible at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Vi9oNs42hs>

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.



This myth becomes the tranquilizer, the assurance that their children are in a better place. Mothers of martyrs gave their martyred son the image of a groom who is on his wedding day and God is waiting to welcome him to heaven. This stems from the *Hadith* which says:

*"that the martyr has six advantages: first that God will forgive all his sins and place the crown of wisdom upon him, each Jewel in the crown is worth the treasures of the world and spared the torture of the grave, be spared from the horror of the Apocalypse, grants forgiveness for seventy of his relatives and lastly is wedded to seventy two black eyed beautiful virgins."*

This myth gives these mothers comfort. In addition, the myth serves another purpose as seen from the above Hadith: it gives the mother consolation that her martyred son will secure a place for her and family in heaven. In that way the family will be reunited in the afterlife.



## PART 2: Opportunities

### The Role of Families in Countering Violent Extremism

The literature on radicalisation, violent extremism and how to counter these phenomena has burgeoned in the last decade, and much continues to be written, learning lessons from the decade of CVE work since the 7/7 bombings on the London transport network. Of the key trends that emerge, the role of families in countering violent extremism, particularly at the prevention and reintegration levels, is particularly significant.

Kleeberg-Niepage identifies that, within right-wing extremist convicts, socialisation is key to their radicalisation, and family and friends are significant influences on this. The normalisation of 'them vs us' attitudes in the family is then followed by the mutual confirmation of the peer group. This shows us that if we can prevent exposure to extremist narratives from a young age, within a family setting, and propose alternative narratives, messaging from extremist groups is less likely to resonate further down the line.<sup>88</sup>

Pisoiu asserts that approaches to countering violent extremism that involve 'spotting the signs of radicalisation', particularly when they are general and focus on manifestations of counter-culture such as clothing, symbols and eating habits, are narrow if employed at the exclusion of other methods. Lynch agrees, suggesting that various "Muslim youth experiences" are in fact normal individual and community processes rather than specifically being linked to radicalisation.<sup>89</sup> Just as being male and under 25 is not a good predictor of radicalisation, so too are confusion over identity, interest in politics, or increased piety poor indicators. That said, if radicalisation is seen as an exploitative process, rather than a personal process of behavioural change, it must be concluded that these elements are cognitive openings that charismatic extremist recruiters are adept at exploiting, so while there may not be a need for targeted prevention in these cases, there should certainly be attention given towards increased safeguarding.

The European Union's Radicalisation Awareness Network looks further at the manifestation of counter-culture, and recommends using subcultural practices for counter-radicalisation, including in the creation of 'benign counter-cultures'. This would involve giving young people more freedom, understanding that they are likely to reject parental or institutional authority, but simply positioning this away from the ideological, political or religious sphere, and otherwise allowing the creation of their own identity. This draws on Olivier Roy's assertion that European foreign terrorist fighters are as much Islamised radicalised as they are radicalised Muslims. While the best youth centre work must be allowed to continue, countering violent extremism must learn

<sup>88</sup> A. Kleeberg-Niepage, 'Zur Entstehung von Rechtsextremismus Im Jugendalter – Oder: Lässt Sich Richtiges Politisches Denken Lernen?', *Journal Für Psychologie*, Vol. 20, no. 2, 2012, pp. 1-30.

<sup>89</sup> D. Pisoiu, 'Subcultural Theory Applied to Jihadi and Right-Wing Radicalization in Germany', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 27, no. 1, 2015, pp. 9-28



from their approaches towards neighbouring problem areas such as underage drinking, truancy and gang recruitment. Even if CVE is not employed at a tactical level, it must play a role at a strategic level, and particular effort must be made to develop social programs designed to strengthen family influence on youth and ties to local communities.

While particular focus has been given to the remarkably high percentage of terrorist attacks in the last two decades that have involved family members, now approaching 30%, the literature has focused much less on the projection of family values by extremist groups. With the emergence of Islamic State, its maintenance of territory, and the perceived obligation among Islamists to emigrate to the so-called Caliphate, there has been an increase in the projection of family in extremist propaganda. Nilsson finds that, along with trends of jihad and takfir becoming normalised, the territorial stronghold of Islamic State has led to the perception of 'home', and therefore a break in the influence of families in increasing the perceived costs of terrorism.<sup>90</sup> Crone identifies that the aesthetic elements that feature in jihadist propaganda frame 'an exemplary way of life' through clothing, scenery, weapons and instant travel, and therefore involve the projection of role models with a direct or indirect call to imitation.<sup>91</sup> Crone remarks that jihadists use propaganda to develop a counter-culture for would-be recruits to copy - through clothing, gestures, language - and try to break existing familial role models and replace them with alternative role models. Nilsson's and Crone's findings are significant because it suggests that extremist groups know that family influence is a threat to their radicalisation and recruitment strategies, and have taken active steps to reduce the influence. It is therefore up to countering violent extremism strategies to adapt and consider how to reassert family strength in this area, most likely through increased primary prevention strategies, namely safeguarding and alternative narratives.

To counteract the perceived religious obligation to emigrate to a Muslim land, which Nilsson identifies as a key reason behind the foreign fighter phenomenon, it is worth considering the role of religion as a counter-narrative in general, and the role of families as messengers of theologically grounded counter-narratives. While Nawaz has noted that the generational gap between parents (often born abroad in Muslim-majority countries before emigrating to the West) and children (brought up between cultures) can create identity crisis, a dissonance in religious formation and may lead politically engaged youth to seek answers beyond the older generation's religious leadership, all of which provides opportunities for extremist recruiters to exploit, less work has been done on the positive theological role that families can play to inoculate youth from this religious exploitation. Daniel Kohler of The German Institute on Radicalisation and Deradicalisation Studies (GIRDS) has seen the positive impact of its two open letters to the self-

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<sup>90</sup> M. Nilsson, 'Foreign Fighters and the Radicalization of Local Jihad: Interview Evidence from Swedish Jihadists', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 38, no. 5, pp. 343-358.

<sup>91</sup> M. Crone, 'Religion and Violence: Governing Muslim Militancy through Aesthetic Assemblages', *Millennium - Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 43, no. 1, 2014, pp. 291-307.



proclaimed Islamic State from its 'Mothers For Life' network, and uses several quotations from the Qur'an and Hadith to remind extremists (and those vulnerable to radicalisation) of the religious duty of honouring their parents. This approach must be replicated internationally, with further engagement with religious text necessary to unpick the ideological exploitation aspects of the radicalisation process.

RAND finds that family plays the most significant role in shaping youth attitudes towards non-violence, in its study of youth in the West Bank. In particular, family obligations were found to be significant in increasing the perceived costs of joining terrorism thereby reducing recruitment, and in increasing the perceived costs of staying in terrorism thereby increasing defection. In RAND's survey of 600 Palestinian youth, in which 62% opposed suicide attacks against Israeli citizens, and 34% thought it unlikely that they would engage in violent protest, 81% said that these attitudes were influenced significantly by their parents. Looking at the study in detail, we see that fear of repression by security forces against family, as well as family obligations were key drivers in individuals not supporting violence. Conversely, those who claimed that parents had minimal influence on their major decisions were statistically more likely to engage in violent protest. Therefore upstream prevention from families can have an important dampening influence on radicalisation, and RAND recommends that families must be empowered to have a greater role in countering violent extremism. Away from the Palestinian theatre, given the trend towards younger extremists and terrorists, and the shortening of the timeframe between the beginning of radicalisation and the moment of the terrorism-related offence, exacerbated by the Daesh-driven foreign fighter phenomenon, upstream prevention and family-led intervention is even more important and the role of influencers on younger audiences (namely at home and at school) is even more pronounced.

Husain wrote of the need to tackle the 'mood music to which suicide bombers dance' and, more recently, Nawaz noted that Al Qaeda and Islamic State were targeting Europe with a 'full-blown jihadist insurgency'.<sup>92</sup> Both identify that strategies that simply use legal tools to target violent actors will be unsuccessful, and the consequences of failure are disproportionate to the level of resources required to take a full-spectrum preventative approach. More acutely, as long as there is sympathy or support for violence among significant proportions of the population, violent individuals can plan acts with impunity and may be provided safe havens in which to operate. A preventative approach need not simply focus on those vulnerable to radicalisation, or those with a propensity to violence, but must shift trends away from support for ideologies or narratives that endorse (or turn a blind eye to) violence. Ranstorp makes a similar point having reviewed the motivations of Swedish foreign fighters, arguing that the social climate of 'pressure cooker communities' leads to the 're-establishment of a code of silence', which often involves tactics

<sup>92</sup> Husain, Ed, *The Islamist* (2007) Penguin

<sup>93</sup> Nawaz, Maajid, *Radical: My Journey Out of Islamist Extremism* (2012), Virgin Books



such as intimidation, harassment of women and vigilante 'religious' policing.<sup>94</sup> A hyperlocal community-oriented approach has traditionally engaged local religious leaders and community groups but has largely overlooked engaging families. RAN recommends involving families as part of a civil society-led approach, particularly in regards to Muslim communities (and Islamist radicalisation), in which the role of the family is even more important than in non-Muslim communities.

RAND recommends that policies aimed at undermining radicalisation should emphasise family, and especially parents, more than friends.<sup>95</sup> It advocates working through civil society leaders to teach parents how to discuss the detrimental messages present on social media, whether or not these messages are linked to political violence, in order to break down residual sympathy or support for extremism and to engage families to be proactive in prevention and, where necessary, intervention. RAN's Youth, Families and Communities working group suggests that parents and families are key to countering the foreign fighter phenomenon because of the younger profile of recruits. It recommends the provision of multiagency support to families, to ensure that they are involved at every level of countering violent extremism and that joined-up and liberalised approaches are pursued.

Beyond prevention, there is certainly a role for families in deradicalisation. Goodstein notes that recidivism is more likely if friends and families remain members of groups that an individual is trying to disengage from, particularly because leaving a group will involve ostracisation from them. This is particularly true in the case of groups like Jamaat-e Islami in South-East Asia, Hizb ut-Tahrir, or Islamic State, who try to recruit entire families and extended kinship networks. Deradicalisation programs in the cases of these individuals must therefore focus on relocating individuals outside of their previous communities. Conversely, programs that include militants' families increase the probability of maintained disengagement. The roles given to families in various programs include engaging them as guarantors of good behaviour, and in providing practical support or counselling, and as Boucek notes, Saudi Arabia has achieved disengagement (if not deradicalisation) success in offering emotional, financial and social support to the family and tribe of a released extremist. Indeed, in the Saudi case, prisoners are often held at facilities closer to their families to facilitate greater interaction, though the transferability of such programs remain in question. In Singapore, the community-based Aftercare Services Group (ACG), provides emotional support to the families of detainees. The aims of this program seem to be to prevent extremism to spread beyond the individual to the community or to the next generation, and to improve the likelihood of detainees accepting rehabilitation. Moreover, Singapore recognises that the family is central in efforts to break an

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<sup>94</sup> M. Ranstorp, L. Gustaffson and P. Hyllengren, P. 'From the Welfare State to the Caliphate. How a Swedish Suburb Became a Breeding Ground for Foreign Fighters Streaming into Syria and Iraq', *Foreign Policy*, 23 February 2015.

<sup>95</sup> Cragin, K and Bradley, M and Robinson, E and Steinberg, P. "What Factors Cause Youth to Reject Violent Extremism? Results of an Exploratory Analysis in the West Bank." RAND Corporation. Accessible at: [http://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_reports/RR1118.html](http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1118.html), pp. 3.



extremist's commitment to an ideology, an organisation, or a leader, and in providing alternative structures and values bases, and it is therefore unsurprising that the recidivism rate is the lowest in the world.<sup>96</sup>

It is notoriously difficult to predict who is going to become radicalised, and therefore 'vulnerability profiles' are often too broad to be useful as they are simply indicative of normal processes of identity formation. Indeed, one of the only reliably indicators of propensity to violent extremism, as Hedayah notes, is proximity to other violent extremists. Terrorism is a "family affair" and should a male relative be involved in extremism, the probability of another relative (male or female) being involved, increases significantly. At any rate, the problem of identifying vulnerability would only pose problems for effective counter-extremism and for society in general, if we were to take inappropriate or overly securitised approaches to counter-extremism. Families have roles across the counter-extremism spectrum, and their active involvement can in fact help with the liberalisation and desecuritisation of this domain, building on the existing relationships they have to ensure that this work is delivered by those closest to the target audience, and reducing the involvement of the state in this domain to the strategic level or through the provision of resources. More broadly, it is accepted in the literature that upstream prevention through education, safeguarding and the promotion of alternative narratives is by far the most effective and cost-effective branch of counter-extremism, free from many of the unintended negative consequences of targeted prevention, law enforcement or deradicalisation. However, should deradicalisation be necessary, there is also a clear precedent for actively involving families in the process.

## How Can Families Counter Violent Extremism?

### Recommendations for government, civil society and families

As is clear from the literature, families must be empowered and can be engaged directly, through local non-governmental organisations, or through institutional structures across the whole range of counter violent extremism approaches. As the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation notes in its recent report on families of violent extremists, "Families are deeply affected by their relatives' radicalization, especially when it involves going abroad and joining a group like Islamic State. Their stories are highly emotional and often excruciating. They involve feelings of pain, confusion, anger, and shame." Neumann and Maher are correct that governments should recognize the value of families in prevention review CVE policies to increase their role.<sup>97</sup>

<sup>96</sup> Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez & Boucek, *Deradicalising Islamist Extremists*, RAND 2010, [http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND\\_MG1053.pdf](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG1053.pdf)

<sup>97</sup> Maher and Neumann, *Pain, Anger, Confusion and Shame: The Stories of Islamic State Families* (ICSR 2016) <http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/ICSR-Report-Pain-Confusion-Anger-and-Shame-The-Stories-of-Islamic-State-Families1.pdf>



The role of families in countering violent extremism can broadly be structured into three main domains - primary prevention, targeted prevention and deradicalisation - each of which can be broken down into three areas:

### **Primary Prevention**

Primary Prevention requires no vulnerability assessment of individuals, but instead introduces soft measures that can prevent radicalisation in the first place. The Educate Against Hate website, established by the UK government, and involving organisations such as Childnet, ParentZone and the NSPCC, houses resources and information that is useful to parents, teachers and youth workers.<sup>98</sup> Governments have overwhelmingly focused on targeted prevention rather than primary prevention, and more resources, training and confidence-building must be made available to families to help them play the critical role they have to prevent radicalisation and counter violent extremism.

#### *Education*

Families can play their part in reducing the likelihood of radicalisation through education. By promoting human rights values and, in Muslim communities, an Islam that synergises with these values, they can reduce vulnerability by promoting critical thinking skills during the pre-contemplation phase, and building resilience to grievances by proactively discussing them through safe lenses, and by teaching loved ones how to (and how not to) respond to grievances that may arise. Digital literacy education for parents is important to ensure that they have a better idea of what their children are up to online, and to allow them to make full use of the tools available to them. Indeed, building parenting skills and knowledge of child development can help strengthen the bond between parents and children and improve communication on difficult topics such as radicalisation.

#### *Safeguarding*

A central area of primary prevention is safeguarding, in which families have an important role. By making loved ones aware of the exploitative nature of extremist groups, the different push and pull drivers of radicalisation, and the dangers of joining violent extremism, families can greatly reduce the prevalence of the problem. Because the pathways into radicalisation are diverse, a broader safeguarding approach through practical integration and empowerment can help build resilience to the radicalisation process. Part of this approach involves working with schools, youth groups and youth workers to establish diversion activities to ensure that rebellion and counter-cultures that develop are not risky. While schools are increasingly fulfilling their responsibility in this regard, a full-spectrum approach is required to safeguard all young people when they are not at school. This is even more important due to extremist groups' use of the Internet to communicate with vulnerable audiences.

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<sup>98</sup> EducateAgainstHate.com



*Alternative narratives*

As role models, parents and families can proactively promote alternative narratives among their loved ones. These include discussing integration, solidarity against extremism and terrorism, shared identity, shared values, and positive action against extremism. This work and approach need not wait until loved ones develop extreme behaviours. More broadly, it is possible to build resilience to grievances by showing examples of the state supporting vulnerable communities, societal empathy with vulnerable communities, both of which can reduce the effectiveness of victimhood narratives, and by painting the positives of a family life compared to the lack of a family life with a terrorist organisation.

**Targeted Prevention**

Spotting the signs of radicalisation and being fully aware of the range of approaches available to prevent escalation to violence, to reduce the negative unintended consequences of taking ill-advised approaches, and to provide off-ramps for those who have taken pathways towards violent extremism, is necessary not just for national governments, local governments and teachers, but is necessary for parents and families too. While families must not be expected to act alone, they must be supported with adequate information and training and often have opportunities to prevent tragedies given the additional access they have in a home setting compared with at school, university, or in community groups. Moreover, any targeted prevention approaches must involve and not alienate families, to ensure that intervention and rehabilitation is sympathetic, and that action towards an individual does not trigger the radicalisation of others in peer or family networks. The TERRA toolkit is the most comprehensive toolkit written to-date in advising and training a variety of stakeholders in the best ways to spot the signs of radicalisation, with recommendations for a tiered engagement strategy, dependent on the degree of radicalisation.<sup>99</sup>

*Counter-narratives*

By pushing back against extremist narratives, families can play a positive role in reducing commitment to an extreme group. Families should focus on the victimhood narrative, the Islamist worldview, them vs us narratives, dehumanizing language, any hint of support for violence, any sense that group grievances are becoming personal, ideological terms that indicate support for Daesh such as Khilafah or jihad. By watching counter-narrative content together, discussing grievances in safe family spaces, and by painting the negatives of a lack of a family life within a terrorist group compared with the positives of life at home, families can break the absolute moral conviction that is required for an individual to carry out an act of violence. FATE's counter-narrative videos and the videos created by organisations part of FATE are useful resources for families to help with this.

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<sup>99</sup> <http://terratoolkit.eu/>



*Intervention*

If families are aware of the signs of radicalisation, such as the 22 factors that contribute to vulnerability as identified by the UK Government's Channel programme, and are equipped with suggested ways to intervene at various levels, as recommended in the TERRA toolkit, then low key intervention is possible without the need for state involvement. Moreover, families can be part of a multi-agency approach that more traditionally involves local authorities, police, independent Channel boards, and Prevent leads at schools. Families must be made aware of the resources available for each of these different types of intervention, and the full range of civil society organisations active in this area and available to support families. As Hedayah identifies, families must themselves be supported as isolation will limit the roles they can play in "identifying, addressing or reporting concerns."<sup>100</sup> Building relationships between the authorities and families is a key way to improve community policing, not simply to help with intelligence-gathering efforts, but more broadly to reduce residual levels of support for non-violent extremism. ICSR note that "families have the potential to become involved in a whole range of activities, such as peer to peer counselling and training."<sup>101</sup>

*Support Networks*

It is important that families are engaged with even when other targeted prevention approaches have been taken with vulnerable people, because in the long term, they will have vital roles to play in ensuring that the best interests of loved ones are looked after, as well as in the deradicalisation process. More generally, should loved ones be considering support or action supporting a violent extremist group, they must feel that they can turn to their family, as isolation is likely to further entrench their worldview and proximity to extremist groups and individuals. Open communication and pastoral care can prevent the escalation to violence.

**Deradicalisation**

The umbrella term deradicalisation refers to a process as nuanced and multifaceted as radicalisation itself, with various push and pull factors, loops, external actors and complex stages. However, there is a role for family at every stage of this process and both government- and civil-society-led programmes in this domain should incorporate family engagement at every level.

*Disengagement*

By offering loved ones a way out from violent extremism, families can counter hate with love. Propensity to violence can be significantly reduced through theological counter-narratives, by offering alternatives to violence, and by breaking down them-vs-us attitudes that dehumanise the

<sup>100</sup> Hedayah, 2014 *The Roles of Families and Communities in Strengthening Community Resilience Against Violent Extremism* <http://www.hedayah.ae/pdf/the-roles-of-families-and-communities-in-building-resilience-meeting-report.pdf>

<sup>101</sup> Maher and Neumann, *Pain, Anger, Confusion and Shame: The Stories of Islamic State Families* (ICSR 2016) <http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/ICSR-Report-Pain-Confusion-Anger-and-Shame-The-Stories-of-Islamic-State-Families1.pdf>



other. By showing foreign terrorist fighters that life at home won't simply be in prison but that there are opportunities for rehabilitation and a family life further down the line, and by creating emotional cognitive openings for those who already have commitment to violent extremism, there is a possibility of reducing this commitment.

#### *Deradicalisation*

Families can reduce commitment to violence by being part of coherent counter-narratives to reduce commitment to violence and alter the balance between perceived reward of staying in an extremist group and the perceived cost of leaving. Beyond violence, families have a displacement role in reducing commitment to charismatic leaders, organisations, ideologies, and worldviews, and then by engineering positive productive responses to grievances and identity crises rather than violence or dehumanising them vs us narratives. For Islamist extremists, some of this deradicalisation process will involve engaging with the pseudo-religious justifications for violent extremism. The Mothers For Life letters to Islamic State are both compelling emotional alternative narratives, and theologically-grounded counter-narratives that can create these cognitive openings and trigger the disengagement process, and this must be followed up with an increased role for families in the complete deradicalisation process.

#### *Rehabilitation and reintegration*

Parents, siblings and extended family networks can provide counselling and mentorship, restoring support for a values base separate from extremism. Families can help loved ones to move on after witnessing or being involved in violence, building alternative support networks free from extremist groups or those involved in the radicalisation process, creating productive diversion activities, proactively addressing grievances or mitigating future risks that may be encountered, and building support for human rights values, as well as an Islam that synergises with these. As Hedayah notes, families of violent extremists have been critical in the rehabilitation process and "family days in prison settings have been effective tools" in reengaging families with detainees in a structured and supervised environment, particularly identifying the role of mothers and wives in the rehabilitation and reintegration of male terrorism related offenders.<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>102</sup> Hedayah, 2014 *The Roles of Families and Communities in Strengthening Community Resilience Against Violent Extremism*  
<http://www.hedayah.ae/pdf/the-roles-of-families-and-communities-in-building-resilience-meeting-report.pdf>



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